#!/usr/bin/env python # -*- coding: utf-8 -*- """ M0 验收测试。 把《05-开发任务拆解》里 M0 的验收标准变成可重复执行的程序: [x] 能开通租户 → 建组织树 → 各角色登录看到不同菜单 [x] 跨租户访问被拦截 [x] schema-postgresql.sql 在测试环境零错误执行 ← 由 Flyway 迁移保证 用法 ---- python scripts/e2e-m0.py python scripts/e2e-m0.py --base http://localhost:8080 退出码:0 = 全部通过;1 = 有失败项(可直接用于 CI)。 依赖:cryptography;且需要能 `docker exec xt-pg`(**清理本脚本造出的测试租户与测试组织**)。 ⚠️ 关于"跑完要清干净"(2026-10 补) 本脚本以前**完全不清理**:每跑一次就留下一个 `e2e######` 租户(里面有一个叫 `admin` 的管理员)+ demo 租户下的 3 个测试组织。跑两轮之后,库里同一时刻就存在两个 `admin` —— 而"账号跨单位重名"这条保护(40012)一旦被别的东西当作前提, 清理残留这一个动作就会把那个脚本**静默反转**(见 `e2e-m1-tenant-domain.py` 文件头)。 所以:跑完(含中途崩溃)必须把自己造的东西删干净,且**只删自己建的**。 """ from __future__ import annotations import argparse import base64 import json import os import subprocess import sys import time import urllib.error import urllib.request if hasattr(sys.stdout, "reconfigure"): sys.stdout.reconfigure(encoding="utf-8") ROOT = os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))) PUB_KEY = os.path.join(ROOT, "deploy", "rsa-public-key-dev.pem") PG_CONTAINER = os.environ.get("XT_PG_CONTAINER", "xt-pg") PG_USER = os.environ.get("PG_USER", "fill") PG_DB = os.environ.get("PG_DB", "filldb") PG_PWD = os.environ.get("PG_PASSWORD", "fill_dev_pwd") PASSED: list[str] = [] FAILED: list[tuple[str, str]] = [] #: 本脚本造出来的东西。放模块级 —— 脚本中途抛异常时也要能被清掉。 CREATED_TENANT_IDS: list[int] = [] CREATED_ORG_IDS: list[int] = [] # ── HTTP ────────────────────────────────────────────── def http(method: str, url: str, body=None, token: str | None = None, timeout: int = 30) -> tuple[int, dict]: data = json.dumps(body, ensure_ascii=False).encode("utf-8") if body is not None else None headers = {"Content-Type": "application/json; charset=utf-8"} if token: headers["Authorization"] = f"Bearer {token}" req = urllib.request.Request(url, data=data, headers=headers, method=method) try: with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=timeout) as resp: return resp.status, json.loads(resp.read().decode("utf-8")) except urllib.error.HTTPError as e: raw = e.read().decode("utf-8") try: return e.code, json.loads(raw) except json.JSONDecodeError: return e.code, {"code": -1, "msg": raw[:200]} def rsa_encrypt(plain: str) -> str: from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import serialization from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import padding with open(PUB_KEY, "rb") as f: pub = serialization.load_pem_public_key(f.read()) return base64.b64encode(pub.encrypt(plain.encode("utf-8"), padding.PKCS1v15())).decode() def login(base: str, username: str, password: str, tenant_code: str | None = None) -> dict: payload = {"username": username, "password": rsa_encrypt(password)} if tenant_code: payload["tenantCode"] = tenant_code try: _, body = http("POST", f"{base}/api/v1/auth/login", payload) except Exception as e: # 网络层失败也要报成一条用例,而不是崩掉 return {"code": -1, "msg": f"请求失败: {e}"} return body or {"code": -1, "msg": "空响应"} # ── 断言 ────────────────────────────────────────────── def data_of(body: dict) -> dict: """安全取 data:响应里 data 可能是 null。""" if not isinstance(body, dict): return {} d = body.get("data") return d if isinstance(d, dict) else {} def list_of(body: dict) -> list: d = body.get("data") if isinstance(d, list): return d if isinstance(d, dict) and isinstance(d.get("list"), list): return d["list"] return [] def check(name: str, cond: bool, detail: str = "") -> bool: if cond: PASSED.append(name) print(f" [PASS] {name}") else: FAILED.append((name, detail)) print(f" [FAIL] {name} {detail}") return cond def expect_code(name: str, body: dict, code: int) -> bool: actual = body.get("code") if isinstance(body, dict) else None return check(name, actual == code, f"期望 code={code},实际 code={actual} msg={body.get('msg') if isinstance(body, dict) else body}") def finish() -> int: print("\n" + "=" * 66) total = len(PASSED) + len(FAILED) if FAILED: print(f" 结果: {len(PASSED)}/{total} 通过 —— 有失败项") print("\n 失败项:") for name, detail in FAILED: print(f" - {name}") if detail: print(f" {detail}") else: print(f" 结果: {len(PASSED)}/{total} 全部通过") print("=" * 66) return 0 if not FAILED else 1 # ── 清理 ────────────────────────────────────────────── def sql(stmt: str) -> tuple[bool, str]: """直接执行 SQL —— 只用于清理测试夹具。""" try: r = subprocess.run( ["docker", "exec", "-e", f"PGPASSWORD={PG_PWD}", PG_CONTAINER, "psql", "-U", PG_USER, "-d", PG_DB, "-t", "-A", "-c", stmt], capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=40) return r.returncode == 0, (r.stdout or r.stderr).strip() except Exception as e: # noqa: BLE001 return False, str(e) _TENANT_TABLES: list[str] | None = None def tables_with_tenant_id() -> list[str]: """ 带 `tenant_id` 的表 —— **动态枚举**,不手抄表名。 手抄的清单在"新增了一张业务表"那天就开始漏,而漏掉的那张表恰好很难被注意到 (租户没了、行还在)。`dev-clean-e2e.py` 是同一口径。 """ global _TENANT_TABLES if _TENANT_TABLES is None: _, out = sql("SELECT table_name FROM information_schema.columns " "WHERE table_schema='public' AND column_name='tenant_id'") _TENANT_TABLES = [t.strip() for t in out.splitlines() if t.strip()] return _TENANT_TABLES def cleanup_all() -> None: """ 删掉本脚本造出来的数据。**幂等**,可以重复调用。 ⚠️ 只删**自己建的**(按本次跑出来的 id):这里刻意不做 `tenant_code LIKE 'e2e%'` 那种"顺手全清" —— 那是 `dev-clean-e2e.py` 的活。 测试脚本越界删别人建的东西,就会让"跑一个脚本把另一个脚本的在途数据删了" 这种事变得可能。 """ for oid in list(CREATED_ORG_IDS): sql(f"DELETE FROM sys_org WHERE id = {oid}") CREATED_ORG_IDS.remove(oid) for tid in list(CREATED_TENANT_IDS): for table in tables_with_tenant_id(): sql(f"DELETE FROM {table} WHERE tenant_id = {tid}") sql(f"DELETE FROM sys_tenant WHERE id = {tid}") CREATED_TENANT_IDS.remove(tid) # ── 用例 ────────────────────────────────────────────── def main() -> int: ap = argparse.ArgumentParser() ap.add_argument("--base", default=os.environ.get("XT_BASE", "http://localhost:8080")) args = ap.parse_args() base = args.base.rstrip("/") stamp = str(int(time.time()))[-6:] new_code = f"e2e{stamp}" if not os.path.exists(PUB_KEY): sys.exit(f"找不到 RSA 公钥:{PUB_KEY}") print("=" * 66) print(" M0 验收测试") print(f" 目标: {base}") print("=" * 66) # ── A. 认证 ─────────────────────────────────────── print("\n[A] 认证与鉴权") body = login(base, "platform", "Platform@123") if not expect_code("A1 平台运营登录成功", body, 0): return finish() platform_token = data_of(body).get("token") # ⚠️ admin 这个账号名在多个租户下都存在(E2E 每次会给新租户也建一个 admin), # 所以必须带 tenantCode —— 这正是服务端「拒绝猜测、要求指明单位」的设计。 body = login(base, "admin", "Admin@123", tenant_code="demo") expect_code("A2 学校管理员登录成功(带租户码)", body, 0) demo_token = data_of(body).get("token") demo_menus = set(data_of(body).get("menus") or []) # 覆盖「账号跨租户重名」这条保护。 # 首次运行时 admin 只存在于 demo 一个租户(此时正常登录是对的); # 反复运行后会出现多个同名 admin(此时必须要求指明单位)。 # 两种都算通过,唯一不允许的是「随便挑一个」。 body = login(base, "admin", "Admin@123") code_n = body.get("code") msg_n = str(body.get("msg", "")) check("A2b 同名账号跨租户时:要么唯一可直接登录,要么要求指明单位——绝不猜", code_n == 0 or (code_n == 40012 and "多个单位" in msg_n), f"code={code_n} msg={msg_n}") expect_code("A3 密码错误返回 40012", login(base, "admin", "WrongPassword!1", "demo"), 40012) # 用每次唯一的账号名,避免上一轮的失败计数触发验证码要求 ghost = f"ghost_{stamp}" expect_code("A4 账号不存在也返回 40012(不泄露账号是否存在)", login(base, ghost, "Whatever@123"), 40012) _, b = http("GET", f"{base}/api/v1/auth/me") expect_code("A5 未带 token 访问受保护接口返回 40101", b, 40101) _, b = http("GET", f"{base}/api/v1/auth/me", token=demo_token) expect_code("A6 /auth/me 正常返回", b, 0) check("A7 返回角色码 SCHOOL_ADMIN", data_of(b).get("roleCodes") == ["SCHOOL_ADMIN"], str(data_of(b).get("roleCodes"))) check("A8 学校管理员菜单不含 tenant(无平台权限)", "tenant" not in demo_menus, f"menus={sorted(demo_menus)}") body = login(base, "platform", "Platform@123") plat_menus = set(data_of(body).get("menus") or []) check("A9 平台运营菜单含 tenant", "tenant" in plat_menus, f"menus={sorted(plat_menus)}") check("A10 两种角色菜单不同(权限渲染生效)", demo_menus != plat_menus, f"demo={sorted(demo_menus)} platform={sorted(plat_menus)}") # ── B. 开通租户 ─────────────────────────────────── print("\n[B] 开通租户") _, b = http("GET", f"{base}/api/v1/tenants", token=demo_token) expect_code("B1 学校管理员无租户管理权限(40301)", b, 40301) _, b = http("POST", f"{base}/api/v1/tenants", { "tenantName": f"E2E 测试学校 {stamp}", "tenantCode": new_code, "tenantType": 1, "contactName": "测试联系人", "contactPhone": "13900139000", "expireTime": "2027-12-31", "adminUsername": "admin", "adminRealName": "E2E 管理员", "adminPhone": "13900139001", }, token=platform_token) expect_code("B2 平台运营开通租户成功", b, 0) created = data_of(b) new_tenant_id = created.get("id") if isinstance(new_tenant_id, int): CREATED_TENANT_IDS.append(new_tenant_id) # 登记,收尾与崩溃路径都要清它 new_pwd = created.get("adminInitialPassword") check("B3 返回初始密码(仅此一次)", bool(new_pwd), json.dumps(created, ensure_ascii=False)[:200]) check("B4 返回小程序码参数", created.get("miniProgramScene") == f"t{new_tenant_id}", str(created.get("miniProgramScene"))) if new_tenant_id is None: return finish() body = login(base, "admin", new_pwd or "x", tenant_code=new_code) expect_code("B5 新租户管理员用初始密码可登录(证明租户作用域切换生效)", body, 0) new_token = data_of(body).get("token") check("B6 新管理员归属租户正确", data_of(body).get("tenant", {}).get("tenantCode") == new_code, str(data_of(body).get("tenant"))) _, b = http("GET", f"{base}/api/v1/tenants?pageNum=1&pageSize=50", token=platform_token) expect_code("B7 租户列表可查", b, 0) ids = [t.get("id") for t in list_of(b)] check("B8 列表含新建租户", new_tenant_id in ids, f"ids={ids}") _, b = http("POST", f"{base}/api/v1/tenants", { "tenantName": "重复编码", "tenantCode": new_code, "tenantType": 1, "contactName": "x", "contactPhone": "13900139000", "expireTime": "2027-12-31", "adminUsername": "admin", "adminRealName": "x", "adminPhone": "13900139002", }, token=platform_token) expect_code("B9 租户编码重复被拒(40001)", b, 40001) # ── C. 组织树 ───────────────────────────────────── print("\n[C] 组织架构") def mk_org(token, parent_id, name, otype, code): _, r = http("POST", f"{base}/api/v1/orgs", { "parentId": parent_id, "orgName": name, "orgType": otype, "orgCode": code, }, token=token) return r b = mk_org(demo_token, None, f"E2E 示范学校 {stamp}", 1, f"ROOT{stamp}") expect_code("C1 建学校节点", b, 0) school_id = b.get("data") b = mk_org(demo_token, school_id, f"E2E 机电系 {stamp}", 2, f"DEPT{stamp}") expect_code("C2 建院系节点", b, 0) dept_id = b.get("data") b = mk_org(demo_token, dept_id, f"E2E 24数控1班 {stamp}", 3, f"CLS{stamp}") expect_code("C3 建班级节点", b, 0) class_id = b.get("data") # 登记(C1/C2/C3 若失败,对应的 data 是 None,不能登记成 0/None) for oid in (school_id, dept_id, class_id): if isinstance(oid, int): CREATED_ORG_IDS.append(oid) expect_code("C4 同级重复组织编码被拒(40001)", mk_org(demo_token, school_id, "重复编码", 2, f"DEPT{stamp}"), 40001) expect_code("C5 组织类型层级颠倒被拒(40001)", mk_org(demo_token, class_id, "层级颠倒", 1, f"BAD{stamp}"), 40001) _, b = http("GET", f"{base}/api/v1/orgs/tree?withCount=true", token=demo_token) expect_code("C6 组织树查询", b, 0) tree = list_of(b) def find(nodes, target): for n in nodes: if n.get("id") == target: return n hit = find(n.get("children") or [], target) if hit: return hit return None check("C7 三层结构正确(班级挂在院系下)", find(tree, class_id) is not None, f"树中未见 id={class_id}") root = find(tree, school_id) check("C8 学校 → 院系 层级正确", root is not None and dept_id in [c.get("id") for c in (root.get("children") or [])], f"children={[c.get('id') for c in (root.get('children') or [])] if root else None}") _, b = http("DELETE", f"{base}/api/v1/orgs/{dept_id}", token=demo_token) expect_code("C9 有下级的组织不可删除(40015)", b, 40015) # ── D. 跨租户隔离 ───────────────────────────────── print("\n[D] 跨租户隔离") _, b = http("GET", f"{base}/api/v1/orgs/tree", token=new_token) expect_code("D1 新租户可查自己的组织树", b, 0) dumped = json.dumps(list_of(b), ensure_ascii=False) check("D2 新租户看不到 demo 租户的组织(租户条件自动注入)", str(school_id) not in dumped, f"新租户树里出现了 demo 的组织 id={school_id}") _, b = http("GET", f"{base}/api/v1/tenants", token=new_token) expect_code("D3 新租户管理员调租户列表被拒(40301)", b, 40301) # ── E. 异常与安全 ───────────────────────────────── print("\n[E] 异常与安全") _, b = http("POST", f"{base}/api/v1/auth/login", {"username": "admin", "password": "not-encrypted"}) check("E1 密码未加密(非法密文)也被拒,不泄露内部信息", b.get("code") in (40012, 40001), f"code={b.get('code')} msg={b.get('msg')}") _, b = http("GET", f"{base}/api/v1/orgs/tree", token="garbage.token.value") expect_code("E2 伪造 token 返回 40101", b, 40101) _, b = http("GET", f"{base}/api/v1/orgs/abc", token=demo_token) check("E3 路径参数类型错误返回 40001", b.get("code") == 40001, f"code={b.get('code')}") _, b = http("POST", f"{base}/api/v1/orgs", {"orgName": "", "orgType": 99, "orgCode": ""}, token=demo_token) check("E4 参数校验失败返回 40001 且带字段级信息", b.get("code") == 40001, f"code={b.get('code')}") # ── F. 清理 ─────────────────────────────────────── print("\n[F] 清理本次造出的测试数据") n_tenant, n_org = len(CREATED_TENANT_IDS), len(CREATED_ORG_IDS) cleanup_all() print(f" 已清理 {n_tenant} 个测试租户(连它的角色与账号)" f"、{n_org} 个挂在 demo 下的测试组织") check("F1 测试租户与测试组织都删掉了", not CREATED_TENANT_IDS and not CREATED_ORG_IDS, f"tenant={CREATED_TENANT_IDS} org={CREATED_ORG_IDS}") return finish() if __name__ == "__main__": # 崩溃也要清:否则每次失败的运行都往库里丢一个 e2e 租户和一个叫 admin 的账号 # (跨租户同名账号就是这么攒出来的,见文件头 ⚠️) try: _code = main() except BaseException: print("\n ⚠ 脚本异常退出,正在清理已造出的测试数据…") cleanup_all() raise raise SystemExit(_code)