# -*- coding: utf-8 -*- """开放接口 E2E(《03-接口设计》§14)—— 供认定机构对接。 ## 验收重点:鉴权是这一批接口的**全部价值所在** 开放接口把数据交给**外部系统**,所以每一个"能拿到数据"的前提都必须被证明是有门槛的: ① **签名**:`HMAC-SHA256(appSecret, appKey + timestamp + nonce + body)`, 且 body 是**原始 JSON**(字段顺序一变签名就不一样); ② **时间窗**:偏差 > 5 分钟拒绝(挡"把昨天抓到的包今天重放"); ③ **nonce 防重放**:5 分钟内同一个 nonce 只能用一次 (且必须是**原子占位** —— 先验签再占位的话,一个错误签名就能把 nonce 消耗掉); ④ **不泄露明文证件号**(契约 §14.2 明确要求)—— 这条要**直接查响应里有没有 18 位数字串**,而不是看代码"应该是脱敏的"; ⑤ **scope 校验**:只有 `submission:read` 的接入方拿不到文件链接; ⑥ **归属校验**:拿 A 任务的路径去拉 B 任务的填报单 → 403 (不校验的话,任何一家机构能拉走全部租户的数据)。 ## 还有一件"契约没写但必须有"的事 §14 定义了"机构怎么调我们",却没定义 **appKey / appSecret 从哪来** —— 没有管理接口,§14 的四个接口在真实流程里**跑不起来**(只能靠改库, 而 appSecret 是密文列)。所以本脚本先建接入方,再验四个接口(见 F-67)。 跑法:python scripts/e2e-m8-open.py """ import argparse import hashlib import hmac import importlib.util import json import os import sys import time import urllib.error import urllib.request import uuid sys.stdout.reconfigure(encoding="utf-8") ROOT = os.path.dirname(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__))) PASSED = [] FAILED = [] CREATED_TASK_IDS = [] CREATED_APP_IDS = [] TMP_ROSTER = os.path.join(ROOT, "scripts", "_e2e-open-roster.xlsx") def _load(name, fn): spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(name, os.path.join(ROOT, "scripts", fn)) mod = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec) spec.loader.exec_module(mod) return mod R = _load("e2e_m2_roster", "e2e-m2-roster.py") A = _load("e2e-m5-audit", "e2e-m5-audit.py") BASE = "http://localhost:8080" STU = 996201 TEACHER = 996202 APP_KEY = "e2e_jxjd_open" APP_KEY_NOFILE = "e2e_only_submission" def ok(name): PASSED.append(name) print(" [OK] " + name) def fail(name, detail): FAILED.append((name, detail)) print(" [FAIL] " + name + "\n " + detail) def check(name, cond, detail=""): if cond: ok(name) else: fail(name, detail or "断言不成立") return bool(cond) def sql(stmt): _, out = R.sql(stmt) return out def body_of(method, path, token=None, payload=None): _, b = R.call(method, BASE + path, token, payload) return b def mp(uid): cfg = R.read_dev_config() return R.mint_mp_token(cfg["jwt_secret"], cfg["issuer"], uid, 1, ["STUDENT"], 4) def open_call(method, path, secret=None, app_key=None, body=None, headers=None, token=None, skew_seconds=0, nonce=None, sign_override=None): """按契约发一个开放接口请求。 body 传**字符串**(原文)—— 签名覆盖的就是它,所以这里刻意不先序列化。 """ url = BASE + path raw = body if isinstance(body, str) else (json.dumps(body, ensure_ascii=False) if body is not None else "") data = raw.encode("utf-8") if raw else None req = urllib.request.Request(url, data=data, method=method) req.add_header("Content-Type", "application/json") hdrs = dict(headers or {}) if token: hdrs["Authorization"] = "Bearer " + token else: ts = str(int(time.time()) + skew_seconds) nc = nonce or uuid.uuid4().hex[:8] hdrs.setdefault("X-App-Key", app_key or APP_KEY) hdrs.setdefault("X-Timestamp", ts) hdrs.setdefault("X-Nonce", nc) if secret is not None: want = sign_override if sign_override is not None else hmac_sign( secret, (app_key or APP_KEY) + ts + nc + raw) hdrs.setdefault("X-Sign", want) for k, v in hdrs.items(): req.add_header(k, v) try: with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=60) as resp: txt = resp.read().decode("utf-8") try: return resp.status, json.loads(txt) except Exception: return resp.status, {"_raw": txt[:200]} except urllib.error.HTTPError as e: txt = e.read().decode("utf-8", errors="replace") try: return e.code, json.loads(txt) except Exception: return e.code, {"_raw": txt[:200]} except Exception as e: return -1, {"_error": str(e)[:200]} def hmac_sign(secret, data): return hmac.new(secret.encode("utf-8"), data.encode("utf-8"), hashlib.sha256).hexdigest() def contains_plain_idcard(obj, ids): """递归找响应里有没有**明文证件号**(脱敏值里有 *,所以要找完整的 18 位)。""" s = json.dumps(obj, ensure_ascii=False) for i in ids: if i in s: return i return None def main(): ap = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="开放接口 E2E") ap.parse_args() print("=" * 74) print(" 开放接口 E2E(§14)—— 供认定机构对接") print("=" * 74) _, adm = R.login(BASE, "admin", "Admin@123", "demo") if adm.get("code") != 0: print(" x 管理员登录失败:" + str(adm)) return 2 at = adm["data"]["token"] print("\n[0] 摆夹具(任务 + 名册 + 一份已终审通过的单子)") suffix = os.urandom(3).hex() idcard = R.with_checksum("36102920080707081") _, b = R.call("POST", BASE + "/api/v1/tasks", at, { "taskName": "E2E开放 " + suffix, "batchNo": "202609", "majorName": "数控加工", "collectMode": 1, "certType": 1, "startTime": "2026-01-01", "endTime": "2026-12-31" }) if b.get("code") != 0: print(" x 建任务失败:" + str(b)) return 2 task_id = b["data"]["id"] CREATED_TASK_IDS.append(task_id) _, b = R.call("GET", BASE + "/api/v1/orgs/tree", at) classes = [] def walk(nodes): for n in nodes or []: if n.get("orgType") == 3: classes.append(n) walk(n.get("children")) walk(b.get("data") or []) org = classes[0] teacher_tok = ensure_teacher(TEACHER, "openT" + suffix, "开放班主任", org["id"]) R.call("PUT", BASE + "/api/v1/tasks/%d/orgs" % task_id, at, {"orgs": [{"orgId": org["id"], "expectedCount": 1, "headUserId": TEACHER}]}) R.call("POST", BASE + "/api/v1/tasks/%d/materials/apply-template" % task_id, at, {"templateCode": "TPL_SCHOOL_ROLL"}) _build_roster([("开放甲", idcard)]) body = R.upload_roster(BASE, at, task_id, TMP_ROSTER, extra={"dryRun": "false", "mode": "APPEND", "orgId": org["id"]}) check("夹具:名册就绪", body.get("code") == 0, json.dumps(body, ensure_ascii=False)[:180]) R.call("POST", BASE + "/api/v1/tasks/%d/publish" % task_id, at, {"force": True}) os.system('docker exec xt-redis redis-cli -a redis_dev_pwd --no-auth-warning ' 'DEL xt:mp:gate:user:%d > NUL 2>&1' % STU) tok = mp(STU) _, b = R.call("POST", BASE + "/api/v1/mp/roster/match", tok, {"taskId": task_id, "realName": "开放甲", "idCardNo": idcard}) if b.get("code") != 0: print(" x 门禁核验失败:" + json.dumps(b, ensure_ascii=False)[:200]) return 2 _, b = R.call("POST", BASE + "/api/v1/mp/submissions", tok, {"taskId": task_id}) sid = b["data"]["id"] res = A.prepare_student(tok, sid, task_id, { "work_unit": "无", "is_retake": False, "is_student": True, "school": "示范职业学校", "major": "数控加工", "enroll_date": "2024-09-01", "occupation": "车工", "worktype": "数控车工", "job_level": "四级" }, dup_first_file=False) check("夹具:学生已提交", ((res.get("data") or {}).get("submitted")) is True, json.dumps(res, ensure_ascii=False)[:200]) # ⚠️ **审核放在"建接入方"之后**:推送只在"终审通过那一刻已存在的接入方"上触发, # 而真实流程也是"机构先接入、之后审核通过才推送"。 # 我第一版把审核放在最前面,于是推送记录永远是 0 条 —— # 而那个现象看起来像"推送功能没做"。 # ── 1. 建接入方(契约没写,但没有它 §14 跑不起来,见 F-67)── print("\n[1] 接入方管理(契约漏了这一层,见 F-67)") made = body_of("POST", "/api/v1/open-apps", at, { "appName": "江西机电认定中心 " + suffix, "appKey": APP_KEY, "callbackUrl": "http://127.0.0.1:9/callback-not-listening", "pushSecret": "push-secret-" + suffix }) check("能新建接入方", made.get("code") == 0, json.dumps(made, ensure_ascii=False)[:250]) app = made.get("data") or {} if app.get("id"): CREATED_APP_IDS.append(app["id"]) secret = app.get("appSecret") check("⭐ 返回 appSecret(**只这一次**)", isinstance(secret, str) and len(secret) >= 20, "长度=%s" % (len(secret) if secret else None)) check("列表**不回** appSecret", all( x.get("appSecret") is None for x in (body_of("GET", "/api/v1/open-apps", at).get("data") or [])), "见列表响应") check("⭐ 库里存的是密文(HMAC 要能还原,所以不能只存哈希)", sql("select app_secret_cipher from collect_open_app where app_key='%s';" % APP_KEY) .strip() != secret, "密文前 20 位=" + sql("select app_secret_cipher from collect_open_app " "where app_key='%s';" % APP_KEY).strip()[:20]) dup = body_of("POST", "/api/v1/open-apps", at, {"appName": "重复", "appKey": APP_KEY}) check("appKey 重复 → 明确报错", dup.get("code") != 0, "code=%s msg=%s" % (dup.get("code"), dup.get("msg"))) # 第二个接入方:只有 submission:read(用来验 scope) made2 = body_of("POST", "/api/v1/open-apps", at, { "appName": "只有填报单权限 " + suffix, "appKey": APP_KEY_NOFILE, "scopes": "submission:read" }) app2 = made2.get("data") or {} if app2.get("id"): CREATED_APP_IDS.append(app2["id"]) secret2 = app2.get("appSecret") check("能建只带 submission:read 的接入方", made2.get("code") == 0, json.dumps(made2, ensure_ascii=False)[:200]) # ── 1b. 让这一份**在接入方已存在之后**通过终审(推送就此触发)── print("\n[1b] 终审通过(此时接入方已存在,推送应被触发)") a1 = body_of("POST", "/api/v1/audit/submissions/%d/approve" % sid, teacher_tok, {"remark": "开放接口夹具:初审", "actionSource": "BUTTON"}) a2 = body_of("POST", "/api/v1/audit/submissions/%d/approve" % sid, at, {"finalOpinion": "开放接口夹具:终审", "actionSource": "BUTTON"}) check("终审通过", a2.get("code") == 0 and (a2.get("data") or {}).get("status") == 3, json.dumps(a2, ensure_ascii=False)[:200]) # 推送是 afterCommit 回调 + 外部 HTTP,给它一点时间(回调地址故意不通,会失败并安排重试) time.sleep(3) # ── 2. 签名校验 ── print("\n[2] 签名校验(这一批接口的价值全在这里)") st, r = open_call("GET", "/api/v1/open/v1/tasks/%d/submissions" % task_id, secret=secret) check("正确签名 → 通过", r.get("code") == 0, "http=%s %s" % (st, json.dumps(r, ensure_ascii=False)[:200])) st, r = open_call("GET", "/api/v1/open/v1/tasks/%d/submissions" % task_id, secret="wrong-secret") check("⭐ 密钥不对 → 40101", r.get("code") == 40101, "http=%s code=%s msg=%s" % (st, r.get("code"), r.get("msg"))) st, r = open_call("GET", "/api/v1/open/v1/tasks/%d/submissions" % task_id, app_key="no-such-app", secret=secret) check("⭐ 不存在的 appKey → 40101(且不透露它是否存在)", r.get("code") == 40101, "code=%s msg=%s" % (r.get("code"), r.get("msg"))) st, r = open_call("GET", "/api/v1/open/v1/tasks/%d/submissions" % task_id, secret=secret, skew_seconds=-400) check("⭐ 时间戳偏差 > 5 分钟 → 拒绝(挡「昨天抓的包今天重放」)", r.get("code") == 40101 and "分钟" in (r.get("msg") or ""), "code=%s msg=%s" % (r.get("code"), r.get("msg"))) st, r = open_call("GET", "/api/v1/open/v1/tasks/%d/submissions" % task_id, secret=secret, skew_seconds=400) check("时间戳快 6 分钟也拒(比的是**偏差绝对值**,不是「不能太旧」)", r.get("code") == 40101, "code=%s" % r.get("code")) st, r = open_call("GET", "/api/v1/open/v1/tasks/%d/submissions" % task_id, secret=secret, headers={"X-Sign": "0" * 64}) check("签名格式对但值不对 → 拒绝", r.get("code") == 40101, "code=%s msg=%s" % (r.get("code"), r.get("msg"))) st, r = open_call("GET", "/api/v1/open/v1/tasks/%d/submissions" % task_id, secret=None, headers={"X-Timestamp": "", "X-Nonce": "", "X-Sign": ""}) check("缺头 → 能照着做的错误消息(提示两种鉴权方式)", r.get("code") in (40101, 40301), "code=%s msg=%s" % (r.get("code"), r.get("msg"))) # nonce 防重放 fixed_nonce = uuid.uuid4().hex[:8] st, r1 = open_call("GET", "/api/v1/open/v1/tasks/%d/submissions" % task_id, secret=secret, nonce=fixed_nonce) check("第一次用这个 nonce → 通过", r1.get("code") == 0, json.dumps(r1, ensure_ascii=False)[:150]) st, r2 = open_call("GET", "/api/v1/open/v1/tasks/%d/submissions" % task_id, secret=secret, nonce=fixed_nonce) check("⭐ 同一个 nonce 第二次 → 拒绝(防重放)", r2.get("code") == 40101 and "nonce" in (r2.get("msg") or ""), "code=%s msg=%s" % (r2.get("code"), r2.get("msg"))) # 错误签名**不该**消耗 nonce(否则能被用来拒绝服务) bad_nonce = uuid.uuid4().hex[:8] open_call("GET", "/api/v1/open/v1/tasks/%d/submissions" % task_id, secret="wrong", nonce=bad_nonce) st, r3 = open_call("GET", "/api/v1/open/v1/tasks/%d/submissions" % task_id, secret=secret, nonce=bad_nonce) check("⭐ 错误签名不该消耗 nonce(否则能被用来拒绝服务)", r3.get("code") == 0, "code=%s msg=%s" % (r3.get("code"), r3.get("msg"))) # ── 3. §14.1 令牌 ── print("\n[3] §14.1 换取访问令牌") tk = open_call("POST", "/api/v1/open/v1/auth/token", body={"appKey": APP_KEY, "appSecret": secret}) check("换令牌成功", (tk[1] or {}).get("code") == 0, json.dumps(tk[1], ensure_ascii=False)[:250]) tokv = (tk[1] or {}).get("data") or {} access = tokv.get("accessToken") check("返回 accessToken", isinstance(access, str) and len(access) > 20, str(access)[:20]) check("⭐ expireSeconds = 7200(契约 §14.1)", tokv.get("expireSeconds") == 7200, str(tokv.get("expireSeconds"))) check("返回 scope 列表", isinstance(tokv.get("scope"), list) and len(tokv.get("scope")) >= 1, json.dumps(tokv.get("scope"), ensure_ascii=False)) st, r = open_call("GET", "/api/v1/open/v1/tasks/%d/submissions" % task_id, token=access) check("⭐ 令牌能直接调数据接口(不用再算 HMAC)", r.get("code") == 0, "code=%s msg=%s" % (r.get("code"), r.get("msg"))) st, r = open_call("GET", "/api/v1/open/v1/tasks/%d/submissions" % task_id, token="not-a-real-token") check("假令牌 → 40101", r.get("code") == 40101, "code=%s" % r.get("code")) st, r = open_call("POST", "/api/v1/open/v1/auth/token", body={"appKey": APP_KEY, "appSecret": "wrong"}) check("appSecret 不对 → 40101(不是把令牌发出去)", r.get("code") == 40101, "code=%s msg=%s" % (r.get("code"), r.get("msg"))) # ── 4. §14.2 填报单 ── print("\n[4] §14.2 拉取填报单") st, r = open_call("GET", "/api/v1/open/v1/tasks/%d/submissions" % task_id, secret=secret) data = r.get("data") or {} check("拉到数据", (data.get("total") or 0) >= 1, json.dumps(data, ensure_ascii=False)[:250]) row = (data.get("list") or [{}])[0] check("带姓名与脱敏证件号", row.get("realName") == "开放甲" and row.get("idCardMask"), json.dumps(row, ensure_ascii=False)[:250]) check("⭐ **响应里没有明文证件号**(契约 §14.2 的硬要求)", contains_plain_idcard(r, [idcard]) is None, "找到了明文:" + str(contains_plain_idcard(r, [idcard]))) check("默认只返回已通过的(status=3)", all(x.get("status") == 3 for x in data.get("list") or []), json.dumps([x.get("status") for x in data.get("list") or []], ensure_ascii=False)) check("带职业/工种/等级", row.get("occupation") == "车工", json.dumps(row, ensure_ascii=False)[:200]) check("带 taskCode / taskName", bool(data.get("taskCode")) and bool(data.get("taskName")), "%s / %s" % (data.get("taskCode"), data.get("taskName"))) # since 增量 future = "2099-01-01T00:00:00" st, r = open_call("GET", "/api/v1/open/v1/tasks/%d/submissions?since=%s" % (task_id, future), secret=secret) check("⭐ since 之后的(未来时间)→ 0 条(增量拉取生效)", ((r.get("data") or {}).get("total") or 0) == 0, json.dumps(r.get("data"), ensure_ascii=False)[:200]) st, r = open_call("GET", "/api/v1/open/v1/tasks/%d/submissions?since=%d" % (task_id, 0), secret=secret) check("毫秒时间戳形式的 since 也认(调用方语言不同,两种都给)", (r.get("code") == 0 and ((r.get("data") or {}).get("total") or 0) >= 1), json.dumps(r.get("data"), ensure_ascii=False)[:200]) st, r = open_call("GET", "/api/v1/open/v1/tasks/%d/submissions?since=不是时间" % task_id, secret=secret) check("⭐ since 格式不对 → 明确报错(不静默当成「不筛」,那会把全量推给对方)", r.get("code") != 0, "code=%s msg=%s" % (r.get("code"), r.get("msg"))) st, r = open_call("GET", "/api/v1/open/v1/tasks/999999999/submissions", secret=secret) check("不存在的任务 → 明确报错", r.get("code") != 0, "code=%s" % r.get("code")) # ── 5. §14.3 文件 ── print("\n[5] §14.3 拉取材料文件") st, r = open_call("GET", "/api/v1/open/v1/tasks/%d/files?submissionIds=%d" % (task_id, sid), secret=secret) fdata = r.get("data") or {} check("拉到文件", len(fdata.get("files") or []) >= 1, json.dumps(fdata, ensure_ascii=False)[:250]) f0 = (fdata.get("files") or [{}])[0] check("带 materialCode / standardName / url / expireSeconds", f0.get("materialCode") and f0.get("standardName") and f0.get("url") and f0.get("expireSeconds") == 1800, json.dumps(f0, ensure_ascii=False)[:300]) check("⭐ 文件里也没有明文证件号", contains_plain_idcard(r, [idcard]) is None, "找到了明文") st, r = open_call("GET", "/api/v1/open/v1/tasks/%d/files" % task_id, secret=secret) check("不传 submissionIds → 明确报错", r.get("code") != 0, "code=%s msg=%s" % (r.get("code"), r.get("msg"))) ids201 = ",".join(str(i) for i in range(1, 202)) st, r = open_call("GET", "/api/v1/open/v1/tasks/%d/files?submissionIds=%s" % (task_id, ids201), secret=secret) check("⭐ 超过 200 份 → 40011(契约 §14.3 的上限)", r.get("code") == 40011, "code=%s msg=%s" % (r.get("code"), r.get("msg"))) st, r = open_call("GET", "/api/v1/open/v1/tasks/%d/files?submissionIds=abc" % task_id, secret=secret) check("submissionIds 里不是数字 → 明确报错", r.get("code") != 0, "code=%s msg=%s" % (r.get("code"), r.get("msg"))) # 归属校验:用别的任务的填报单 id 去拉 st, r = open_call("GET", "/api/v1/open/v1/tasks/999999999/files?submissionIds=%d" % sid, secret=secret) check("⭐ 用别的任务路径拉这份文件 → 被拦住(不校验就能拉走全部数据)", r.get("code") != 0, "code=%s msg=%s" % (r.get("code"), r.get("msg"))) # ── 6. scope ── print("\n[6] scope 权限") # ⚠️ 必须带**它自己的** appKey:不带的话 open_call 会用第一个接入方的 key, # 于是签名对不上 —— 表现是"签名不通过",很容易被误判成实现有 bug st, r = open_call("GET", "/api/v1/open/v1/tasks/%d/submissions" % task_id, secret=secret2, app_key=APP_KEY_NOFILE) check("只有 submission:read 的接入方能拉填报单", r.get("code") == 0, "code=%s msg=%s" % (r.get("code"), r.get("msg"))) st, r = open_call("GET", "/api/v1/open/v1/tasks/%d/files?submissionIds=%d" % (task_id, sid), secret=secret2, app_key=APP_KEY_NOFILE) check("⭐ 同一个接入方拉文件 → 40301(没有 file:read)", r.get("code") == 40301 and "file:read" in (r.get("msg") or ""), "code=%s msg=%s" % (r.get("code"), r.get("msg"))) # ── 7. 停用立刻生效 ── print("\n[7] 停用立刻生效(不用等令牌过期)") st, r = open_call("GET", "/api/v1/open/v1/tasks/%d/submissions" % task_id, token=access) check("停用前令牌可用", r.get("code") == 0, "code=%s" % r.get("code")) tg = body_of("POST", "/api/v1/open-apps/%d/toggle" % app["id"], at) check("停用接入方", tg.get("code") == 0 and (tg.get("data") or {}).get("enabled") is False, json.dumps(tg, ensure_ascii=False)[:200]) st, r = open_call("GET", "/api/v1/open/v1/tasks/%d/submissions" % task_id, token=access) check("⭐ 停用后**未过期的令牌也立刻失效**(令牌校验每次回查接入方)", r.get("code") == 40101, "code=%s msg=%s" % (r.get("code"), r.get("msg"))) st, r = open_call("GET", "/api/v1/open/v1/tasks/%d/submissions" % task_id, secret=secret) check("停用后 HMAC 也不通", r.get("code") == 40101, "code=%s" % r.get("code")) body_of("POST", "/api/v1/open-apps/%d/toggle" % app["id"], at) st, r = open_call("GET", "/api/v1/open/v1/tasks/%d/submissions" % task_id, secret=secret) check("重新启用后恢复", r.get("code") == 0, "code=%s" % r.get("code")) # ── 8. §14.4 推送与重试 ── print("\n[8] §14.4 推送(含重试与人工重推)") pl = body_of("GET", "/api/v1/open-apps/push-logs", at).get("data") or [] check("⭐ 终审通过时**自动**建了推送记录(审批链路真的接上了)", len(pl) >= 1, "共 %d 条:%s" % (len(pl), json.dumps(pl, ensure_ascii=False)[:250])) if pl: mine = [x for x in pl if x.get("submissionId") == sid] check("有这份填报单的推送记录", len(mine) >= 1, json.dumps(pl, ensure_ascii=False)[:300]) if mine: rec = mine[0] check("⭐ 回调地址不通 → 记了失败原因与 HTTP 结果(不是安静地什么都不做)", rec.get("attempts") and rec.get("attempts") >= 1 and (rec.get("lastError") or rec.get("lastHttpCode")), json.dumps(rec, ensure_ascii=False)[:300]) check("⭐ 失败后安排了下次重试(契约 §14.4 的 1/5/30/120/600 秒)", rec.get("status") == 2 and rec.get("nextRetryAt"), json.dumps(rec, ensure_ascii=False)[:250]) rp = open_call("POST", "/api/v1/open/v1/callback/push", secret=secret, body={"submissionId": sid}) check("⭐ 人工重推可用(契约 §14.4 的「支持人工重推」)", (rp[1] or {}).get("code") == 0, json.dumps(rp[1], ensure_ascii=False)[:250]) rp2 = open_call("POST", "/api/v1/open/v1/callback/push", secret=secret, body={}) check("人工重推不传 submissionId → 明确报错", (rp2[1] or {}).get("code") != 0, json.dumps(rp2[1], ensure_ascii=False)[:200]) check("⭐ 推送报文里没有明文证件号(与 §14.2 同口径)", "身份证" not in (sql("select coalesce(payload_json,'') from collect_open_push_log " "where submission_id=%d limit 1;" % sid) or "") or idcard not in (sql("select coalesce(payload_json,'') from collect_open_push_log " "where submission_id=%d limit 1;" % sid) or ""), "payload=" + (sql("select coalesce(payload_json,'') from collect_open_push_log " "where submission_id=%d limit 1;" % sid) or "")[:200]) # ── 9. 权限:学生/未登录不能碰管理接口 ── print("\n[9] 管理接口的权限") b = body_of("GET", "/api/v1/open-apps", mp(996299)) check("学生看接入方列表 → 403", b.get("code") in (40101, 40301, 403), "code=%s" % b.get("code")) b = body_of("GET", "/api/v1/open-apps") check("未登录看接入方列表 → 40101", b.get("code") == 40101, "code=%s" % b.get("code")) # 开放接口本身是匿名的(@PublicApi),但没有凭据必须拒绝 st, r = open_call("GET", "/api/v1/open/v1/tasks/%d/submissions" % task_id, secret=None, headers={"X-Timestamp": "", "X-Nonce": "", "X-Sign": ""}) check("⭐ 开放接口是匿名的,但**没有凭据一律拒绝**", r.get("code") in (40101, 40301), "code=%s msg=%s" % (r.get("code"), r.get("msg"))) cleanup() print("\n" + "=" * 74) print("通过 %d 失败 %d 共 %d" % (len(PASSED), len(FAILED), len(PASSED) + len(FAILED))) print("=" * 74) for n, det in FAILED: print(" x " + n + "\n " + det) return 1 if FAILED else 0 def ensure_teacher(uid, username, name, org_id): sql(""" INSERT INTO sys_user (id, tenant_id, username, real_name, password, org_id, user_type, status) VALUES (%d, 1, '%s', '%s', '$2a$10$6NB7sObvoHRwzhLJwZ2CHOAbdECgMJGiiTeMY6.zo3IJyd8TEKLEO', %d, 3, 1) ON CONFLICT (id) DO UPDATE SET real_name = EXCLUDED.real_name, org_id = EXCLUDED.org_id, username = EXCLUDED.username, password = EXCLUDED.password, user_type = EXCLUDED.user_type, status = 1 """ % (uid, username, name, org_id)) role_id = sql("select id from sys_role where tenant_id=1 and role_code='HEAD_TEACHER' " "and deleted=0 limit 1;").strip() sql("delete from sys_user_role where user_id=%d;" % uid) sql("INSERT INTO sys_user_role (user_id, role_id, tenant_id) VALUES (%d, %s, 1);" % (uid, role_id)) _, b = R.login(BASE, username, "Admin@123", "demo") if b.get("code") != 0: raise SystemExit(" 班主任 %s 登录失败:%s" % (username, b)) return b["data"]["token"] def _build_roster(rows): from openpyxl import Workbook wb = Workbook() ws = wb.active ws.title = "开放班" header = ["序号", "姓名", "身份证号", "学历", "联系电话", "工作单位", "报考职业", "报考工种", "报考等级", "是否补考", "补考理论", "补考实操", "补考综合", "是否在校生", "在读学校", "所学专业", "入学时间"] for c, t in enumerate(header, start=1): ws.cell(row=1, column=c, value=t) for i, (name, idc) in enumerate(rows): vals = [i + 1, name, idc, "中专", "1380013770%d" % i, "无", "车工", "数控车工", "四级", "否", "", "", "", "是", "示范职业学校", "数控加工", "2024-09-01"] for c, v in enumerate(vals, start=1): if v != "": ws.cell(row=i + 2, column=c, value=v) wb.save(TMP_ROSTER) def cleanup(): for tid in CREATED_TASK_IDS: R.sql("delete from collect_open_push_log where task_id=%d;" % tid) R.sql("delete from collect_validation_issue where task_id=%d;" % tid) R.sql("delete from collect_audit_record where task_id=%d;" % tid) R.sql("delete from collect_notify_record where task_id=%d;" % tid) R.sql("delete from collect_file where task_id=%d;" % tid) R.sql("delete from collect_submission where task_id=%d;" % tid) R.sql("delete from collect_roster where task_id=%d;" % tid) R.sql("delete from collect_task_org where task_id=%d;" % tid) R.sql("delete from collect_material_def where task_id=%d;" % tid) R.sql("delete from collect_task where id=%d;" % tid) R.sql("delete from collect_open_push_log where app_id in " "(select id from collect_open_app where app_key like 'e2e_%');") R.sql("delete from collect_open_app where app_key like 'e2e_%';") R.sql("delete from collect_message where user_id in (996201, 996299);") R.sql("delete from collect_notify_record where receiver_id in (996201, 996299);") R.sql("delete from sys_user_role where user_id = %d;" % TEACHER) R.sql("delete from sys_user where id = %d;" % TEACHER) if os.path.exists(TMP_ROSTER): os.remove(TMP_ROSTER) print(" 已清理:任务 / 接入方 / 推送记录 / 测试账号 / 临时 Excel") if __name__ == "__main__": raise SystemExit(main())